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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

DIRECT IMPORT BUYERS' ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant, OaseNo.
vs.
13966
K.S.L., INC,
Defendant-Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for libel and slander. The plaintiff
brought the action against the defendant after defendant
aired, on television and radio, certain statements which
plaintiff claims were false, misleading, and detrimental
to plaintiffs sales program and business reputation. Plaintiff further claims that the defendant's agent and employee, Lynn Packer^ knew of the falsity of the statements when made and published, and failed to use rea-
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sonable care to ascertain the accuracy of other statements
published by the defendant.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Prior to the completion of discovery, defendant
moved for a summary judgment. From a judgment granting defendant's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks to reverse the summary judgment and
have the case remanded to the district court for trial on
the merits.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff alleges that Lynn Packer, the defendant's
employee, caused to be broadcast over television and
radio certain untrue statements regarding a product sold
by the plaintiff known as Ecomo-Jets or Eoono-Needle.
The plaintiff's action is based upon the common law cause
of action of libel and slander and on Section 45-2-7, Utah
Code Annotated (1953), as amended.
The defendant denies that any defamatory statements were uttered or published by the defendant's agent
and employee, Lynn Packer, and claims that any statement uttered or published by Lynn Packer was true and
correct.
After the plaintiff's complaint and defendant's answer had been filed, the defendant submitted two sets
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of brief interrogatories to the plaintiff and answers to the
interrogatories were filed. Thereafter the plaintiff took
the deposition of Mr. Lynn Packer who was the news
reporter publishing the statements complained of by the
plaintiff. During the deposition Mr. Packer was asked
to state the name of a "local Salt Lake executive" who
stated that the plaintiff's product was a "waste of money,"
and Mr. Packer refused to divulge the information and
claimed the constitutional privilege of the First Amendment for his refusal to disclose the source of his information. Plaintiff thereafter brought a motion to compel the
answer and plaintiff's motion was granted. After the
order was issued to compel the defendant to reveal the
source of his information, a second deposition was taken
of Mr. Packer to establish Mr. Packer's refusal under
oath.
The second deposition was delayed because the attorneys for defendant K.S.L., Inc., Mr. Ray R. Ohristensen and Mr. W. Clark Burt advised counsel for the plaintiff that they were not representing Mr. Packer personally
and Mr. Packer would need to obtain independent counsel. Plaintiff delayed the second deposition until Mr.
Packer was able to retain independent counsel to appear
with him at the second deposition.
After the second deposition was taken and Mr.
Packer's refusal established under oath, a motion for an
order to show cause and an order to show cause was filed
and served and scheduled for hearing. Prior to the hearing the defendant K.S.L., Inc., through its attorney, Mr.
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Ray R. Chrisitensen, brought a motion for summary judgment and by stipulation of the parties the order to show
cause was deferred subject to rescheduling after the motion for summary judgment.
The defendant's motion for summary judgment was
based on its contention that there were no genuine issues
of fact which would entitle plaintiff to proceed with the
case to trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
All references to page numbers other than case citations are references to Mr. Packer's first deposition.
The Utah Supreme Court has on numerous occasions
reaffirmed the long established rule that summary judgment could only be granted where the pleadings, evidence,
admissions, and inferences therefrom viewed most favorable to the loser must show that there is no genuine issue
of material fact and that the winner is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Frederick May & Co. v. Dunn,
13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P. 2d 266 (1962). In Thompson v.
Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 30, 395 P. 2d 62 (1964), the
court ruled that the adverse party is entitled to have the
evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn there-
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from viewed in the light most favorable to him. In Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guaranty Ins., Underwriters, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 211, 398 P. 2d 685 (1965), the
Utah Supreme Court held that any doubts regarding the
propriety of summary judgment should be resolved in
favor of the adverse party. In Singleton v. Alexander,
19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P. 2d 126, the court ruled thsat the
weight of testimony submitted by way of deposition and
affidavit or the credibility of a witness should not be
considered in a motion for summary judgment, and the
only question to be determined is whether or not there
is a dispute as to any material fact and whether or not
the moving party should prevail as a matter of law.
Of the various issues raised in defamation suits, the
court, in Utah Farm Bureau Federation v. National Farmers Union Service Corp., 198 F. 2d 20, ruled that the
question as to the public nature or concern, fair, privileged,
malicious, and libelous nature of the statement is usually
a question for the jury to be decided under all circumstances surrounding the case.
By its complaint the plaintiff alleged that defendant's
employee and agent, Lynn Packer, uttered untrue statements and published certain untrue statements knowing
them to be untrue as uttered or published and further
published or uttered statements, the inferences of which
would lead the listener or viewer to a false and misleading condusion because of the omission of other information. For example, Mr. Packer quoted Mr. White of New
Hampshire extensively in his reports. The statements
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attributed to Mr. White were to the effect that plaintiff's
products were useless, that the products may be in violation of antipollution laws because the carburetor jets
had to be replaced and could cause burned valves in automobiles. Yet Mr. Packer admits in his deposition that
he knew Mr. White had not tested these products (page
11, lines 11-20) and had no evidence as to burned valves
and knew that the United States Clean Air Act does
not prohibit per se disturbing a car's existing idle screws
(page 14, lines 2-5 and 19-25). It is certainly false that
the United States Clean Air Act or any other antipollution legislation per se prohibits disturbing the idle screws
on carburetors or on any other portion of an automobile's
antipoHution device. It is true that any modification or
adjustment of an automobile's antipollution system which
lessens the overall effectiveness of the antipollution system
is prohibited by law. Mr. Packer was aware of this distinction at the time of the broadcast of November 14,
1973, whereby he states:
"And Dr. Grant Winn of the Utah Air Consearvation Committee said the Eoono-Jets would be
unlawful if they alter — for the worse — a car's
air pollution control equipment." (Emphasis
added.)
Mr. Packer stated in his broadcast that a "local
auto executive said he personally thinks such devices are
a waste of money." This statement was published by Mar.
Packer notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Packer knew
before the broadcast that the unidentified auto executive
did not test the device in question nor did the company
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for whom such person was working test the device (page
19, lines 13, 14). Mr. Packer refers to a California government agency in his report and states:
"In 1971 a California government agency tested
Econojets and found the units decreased carbon
monoxide emissions but increased hydro carbon
and nitrogen oxides emissions."
In Mr. Packer's affidavit for summary judgment, Mr.
Packer states he reviewed the California Air Resources
Board's emission test on Econo-Needle carbon modification. He further states in his deposition that he read
through all of the California Air Resources Board report
prior to his first broadcast of November 14, 1973 (page
20, lines 15-16; page 21, lines 14-21). The California Air
Resources Board of Resolution 71-58, September 15, 1971,
which is in evidence before the court, and (the specific
findings of the Air Resources Board indicate that "the
Econo-Needle device does not reduce the effectiveness
of any required motor vehicle pollution control device for
1969-model year and earlier vehicles with engines over
140 cubic inch displacement and is therefore exempt from
the prohibitions of Section 27156 of the Vehicle Code."
The report also indicates that notwithstanding the mathematical calculations reflected on the bottom of page 2
of their report, the California engineers conducting the
test concluded that the device "produces less carbon
monoxide than operation with the standard idle screw.
The device appears to have little effect on hydrocarbon
and nitric oxide emissions."
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Since Mr. Packer admitted that he was aware of the
full report and had read through the entire report, Mr.
Packer knew the statements he uttered on tdevision
and radio could only be construed to mean the plaintiff's
product was in violation of the California Air Resources
Board standards when in fact the plaintiff's product had
passed the California Air Resources Board test and was
given approval for sale in the state of California, at least
on 1969 vehicles and earlier models. Mr. Packer's statement regarding the Califorfnia Air Resources Board test
combined with his other statements of Dr. Grant Winn
and Mr. A. J. White all lead to a distorted and false conclusion that this device was in violation of the laws of
the state of California and in other states. Furthermore,
since Mr. Packer admits that he read through all of the
California Air Resources Board tests, Mr. Packer knew
that the test itself reflected a reduction in gasoline consumption during the test but neglected to mention this
particular fact to his audience.
In Mr. Packer' affidavit for summary judgment, Mr.
Packer admits having had the benefit of the test result
from the automotive testing laboratory of Aurora, Colorado, yet Mr. Packer failed to mention in any of his
broadcasts tha the Aurora, Colorado, tests showed an
average decrease of 40 percent in carbon monoxide, an
average decrease of 23 percent in hydrocarbons, and an
average increase of 5 percent of oxides of nitrogen for
an overall decrease in engine pollutants. He also failed
to state that the test indicated there was an average in-
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crease in miles per gallon or a savings to the motorist
between 5 to 8 percent pursuant to the test.
Finally, Mr. Packer admits that he had come to the
conclusion that at least some of the claims being made
for the product were fraudulent at the time of his first
broadcast (page 39, lines 3-14). Since the only claim
made by the plaintiff was that the device could save up
to 6 miles per gallon in fuel consumption, it must be
assumed that Mr. Packer concluded that some portion
of this claim was fraudulent and he therefore intended to
expose this with public disclosure.
In fact, Mr. Packer had no substantial information
upon which to base his opinion or his conclusions that
the claimed benefits of the product were fraudulent, and
Mr. Packer relied solely on two sources, both of which
admittedly had not tested the product. Mr. Packer was
in fact aware that some of the statements which he
uttered or published were false or misleading.
The lower court, at the hearing on plaintiff's motion
to set aside the summary judgment, advised counsel for
the plaintiff and the defendant that the court's decision
was based upon Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 94 S. Ct.
2997 (1974). The lower court stated that he believed
that opinion held that the news media is given complete
immunity in discussing issues of public concern regardless of the truth or falsity of the statement and regardless of whether the false statements were made know-
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ingly, intentionally, or with complete disregard as to the
accuracy of the statement.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra, invloved the publication of certain defamatory statements by a magazine
publisher. The defendant published certain {statements
about the plaintiff, a reputable Chicago attorney, and
claimed the privilege and immunity on the basis that the
First Amendment protected publishers against defamation suits when the articles involved matters of general
public interest or persons who could be considered public
figures.
The Court held that the First Amendment does not
protect a publisher when a private individual is injured
by defamatory statements notwithstanding the fact that
the topic of discussion is of public interest. In so holding, the Court stated:
". . . there is no constitutional value in false
statements of fact. Neither the intentional He
nor the careless error materially advances society's interest in 'uninhibited, robust, and wideopen' debate on public issues . . . They belong
to that category of utterances which 'axe no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are
of such slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality.'
•

• •

"The legitimate state interest underlying the law
of libel is the compensation of individuals for
the harm inflicted on them by defamatory false-
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hoods. We would not lightly require the State to
abandon this purpose, for, as Mr. Justice Stewart
has reminded us, the individual's right to the protection of his own good name 'reflects no more
than our basic concept of the essential dignity
and worth of every human being — a concept at
the root of any decent system of ordered liberty. The protection of private personality, like
the protection of life iself, is left primarily to the
individual states under the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments . . / "
The Court further holds that the states should retain
substantial latitude in enforcing the legal remedy for
defamatory falsehoods injurious to private individuals and
specifically refuses to extend the First Amendment immunity to matters of public interest where the injury
is to a private individual.
In granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the lower court was compelled to find as a matter
of law the following conclusions:
1.

There were no material issues of fact which
would merit a trial of the case.

2.

The plaintiff is a public person or public
figure in the nature of a political candidate.

3.

All of the statements made by Lynn Packer
were true*

4.

If the statements made by Lynn Packer
were false, he made a reasonable and diligent search for the truth and used due care
in publishing false statements.
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5.

Lynn Packer did not act maliciously in making any false statements.

6.

Any utterances or publication by Lynn
Packer, if false, were privileged.

All of the issues outlined above, under the Utah
Farm Bureau Federation case, are issues to be decided
by the jury together with all of the circumstances surrounding the case.
Carey v. Hearst Publications, 19 Wash. 2d 655, 143
P. 2d 857 (1943) sheds considerable light on the question
of use of reasonable care or diligence in uttering or publishing statements in the news reporting industry.
The case involved the reporting of a judicial proceeding and the newspaper reported on certain statements
made by an attorney who had taken the witness stand
to testify. In its defense, the newspaper cootended that
since they relied on reputable news wire service for their
informaition and since it involved the reporting of a judicial proceeding, the plaintiff should not prevail because
of the use of due car and diligence in reporting the news
and because the reporting of a judicial proceeding was
privileged. As to the first contention of due care, the
court stated:
". . . It is ordinarily held that the publication of
defamatory matter by a newspaper is not privileged by reason of the fact that it is copied from
another publication, or comes through the regular channels of news collection, without any notice of its falsity, and that the newspaper pub-
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lishing it is liable in damages to the person
libeled,, in the absence of other justification."
As to the claim of privilege for reporting a judicial
proceeding, the court stated:
"Appellants contend that, being the report of a
judicial proceeding, publication of the story is
attended by the rule of qualified privilege, and
that malice must be alleged and proved in order
to sustain a cause of action. Truth of a story,
libelous pr se, is a complete defense. If the story
be false, however, qualified privilege does not
absolve the publisher even though the charges
be made in good faith."
The question of qualified privileges has been ruled
upon by the Utah Supreme Court in Berry v.
Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P. 2d 814 (1958). In
this case a doctor of a patient gave out information
to another doctor who was inquiring in behalf of the
girl's family. The lower court held that the doctor had
a conditional privilege and instructed the jury of the conditional privilege. The lower court also instructed the
jury that if the statement was true or if the defendant
had probable cause to believe the statement to be true,
it would constitute a defense. The Utah Supreme Court
held that even if circumstances warranted a conditional
privilege, the conditional privilege could be defeated. In
so holding, the court stated:
"We are aware that it is frequently stated that
where the situation is privileged there is no lia-
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bility in the absence of actual malice. However,
an examination of the authorities reveals that
quite generally, when the matter is actually in
issue, they are in accord upon a principle which
we consider sound and salutary: that the privilege to pass on derogatory information, which
proves false, must have been exercised with at
least reasonable discretion, or the publisher will
be held responsible therefor . . ."
The court further cites the Restatement of Torts
which reads:
"Even though the occasion is so privileged, a
particular person cannot avail himself of the
privilege arising therefrom if he abuses the occasion * * * The occasion may be abused by
the publisher's lack of belief or reasonable
grounds for belief in the truth of the defamatory
matter * * *; by the publication of the defamatory matter for some improper purpose
* * *; by excessive publication * * *;
or by the publication of defamatory matter not
reasonably believed to be necessary to accomplish the purpose. * * *"
The court goes further and states:
It is significant that the privilege we are here
concerned with is referred to as a 'conditional'
or 'qualified' privilege. The reason for the limiting adjectives is that it must be exercised with
certain cautions: (a) it must be done in good
faith and reasonable care must be exercised as
to its truth, (b) likewise, the information must
be reported fairly, (c) only such infonnation
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should be conveyed, and (d) only to such persons as are necessary to the purpose . . .
"(a) It seems hardly necessary to state that
one cannot pass on derogatory information indifferent to its truth, or the consequences thereof, but failure to exercise reasonable care and
diligence to ascertain the truth destroys the privilege . . .
". . . But the privilege is not something which
arises automotically and becomes absolute
merely because there is an interest to protect.
It has its origin in, and it is governed by, the
rule of good sense and customary conduct of
people motivated by good will and proper consideration for others . . . The policy of the law
concerning this matter is framed in the light of
the hazard that defamation can so easily undermine or destroy a most precious possession: a
good name and reputation. In ancient writ it is
said 'A good name is rather to be chosen than
great riches.' Recognizing that a good name is
so hard to acquire and to preserve, yet so vulnerable to being tarnished, the law imposes upon
one publishing derogatory information, even for
laudatory purposes, the responsibility of exercising due care in what he does and in knowing
whereof he speaks."
The Berry case referred to above follows closely in
line with Section 45-2-7, Utah Code Annotated (1953),
as amended. That section states in part:
"Nothing in this act contained shall be construed to relieve any person broadcasting over
a radio or television station from liability under
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the law of libel, slander, or defamation. Nor
$hall anything in this act be constsrued to relieve
any person, firm, or corporation owning or operating a radio or television broadcasting station
or network from liability under the law of libel,
slander, or defamation on account of any broadcast prepared or made by any such person* firm,
or corporation . . ."
In Demrrum v. Star Broadcasting Co., 28 Utah 2d
50, 497 P. 2d 1378 (1972), the court was involved in
determining whether or not a radio station could claim
the privilege under Section 45-2-5, Utah Code Annotated
(1953) against a defamatory statement which was made
by a anonymous caller to the radio station on one of the
popular two-way radio shows. The case involved the
plaintiff Demman who was running for a county commission position. The court, in a 3-to-2 decision, held
that the radio station was protected by a qualified privilege. It is interesting to note, however, that one of the
judges in the majority decision concurred on the basis
that the plaintiff had stipulated that certain issues of
fact be determined by the court rather than by the jury
and that the concurring justice was concurring simply
because of that stipulation. In so stating, Justice Tuckebt
stated:
"Ordinarily, the plaintiff would be entitled to
have the issue of malice as well as other fact
questions determined by a jury. However, the
record before us indicates that the plaintiff
agreed in the district court to have the issues determined by the court from the pleadings, depo-
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sitions and affidavits on file. The plaintiff having agreed to that procedure he cannot claim
on appeal that his right to a jury trial was denied."
The other two dissenting justices, Justice EUett and
Justice Crockett, dissented from the main opinion and
stated that the summary judgment should be reversed
and the case remanded for trial. In so stating, Justice
EUett stated:
"The plaintiff alleged that Wilcox (the broadcaster) failed to exercise due care in preventing
the publication.
'The defendants made a motion for summary
judgment and filed an affidavit wherein they
claimed there was no evidence of malice or failure
to exercise due care to prevent the broadcast of
the utterances complained of.
"In considering a motion for summary judgment
the court looks only to see if there are no genuine issues of fact in dispute. It does not weigh
the evidence or draw inferences therefrom."
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff respectfully submits that all of the evidence before the court and the affidavits clearly show
that the following issues of feet remain for adjudication
by the trier of fact:
1.

2.

Whether or not the plaintiff is a public person and therefore subject to a claim of conditional privilege.
Whether or not the information broadcast
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by the defendant was of the nature which
would provide the defendant with qualified
privilege.
3.

If the conditional privilege existed, whether
or not plaintiff can prove actual malice or
the lack of due care in the publicatibn and
utterances of the statements complained of.

4.

Whether or not the statements complained
of were true or untrue.

5.

If imtrue, whether or not the defendant
knew or should have known that the statements were false.

6.

Whether or not the statements made, if true
to the extent of the statement, were not
by withholding all of the information available to the defendant so as to more accurately reflect the conclusions or findings of
testing laboratories and government agencies.

Plaintiff submits that the summary judgment should
be reversed and the case be remanded for trial.
Respectfully submitted,
KENNETH M. HISATAKE
250 East 300 South
Broadway Plaza, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant
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was served on counsel for the respondent, Ray R. Christensen of Christensen, Gardiner, Jansen & Evans, 900
Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, and W.
Clark Burt of Callister, Greene & Nebeker, 800 Kenneoott
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, by mailing two
copies thereof in a postage prepaid envelope on the twenty-sixth day of March, 1975.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

